Transformation Of Nato: 
A Politico-military Assessment
In The Age Of Austerity And Emerging Threats

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Summary

Facing the 21st century’s complex threat landscape and emerging security challenges, the North Atlantic Alliance has been pursuing a significant transformation. Marked by the 2010 Strategic Concept, this transformation is not limited with the aim of improvement in technological aspects, but reflects a major shift in the geopolitical paradigm and strategic thought of NATO for promoting the allied capabilities on collective defense and cooperative security issues. In this regard, the North Atlantic Alliance has introduced key structures and concepts, such as the NATO Response Force and the Connected Forces Initiative, in order to address present and future threats. Yet, NATO-member nations’ defense economics have been in decline in recent years that could cause important setbacks. At this point, the merits of the Smart Defense approach come into the picture. Finally, the current security environment suggests the very need for confronting a mix of traditional and non-traditional challenges. Clearly, while NATO’s agenda has been focusing on terrorism, cyber defense, and energy security issues; at the eastern part of the Alliance, a state-led threat, the Russian Federation, continues to provoke Cold War-reminder threat perceptions. Besides, the allied missile defense and the future of NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons deserve attention for assessing NATO’s transformation.
As the security challenges of the 21st century has been transforming into a set of interrelated and complex threat landscapes, the North Atlantic Alliance is also transforming its capabilities, structure, and more importantly, its decades-long paradigm on collective defense and cooperative security issues. Such a transformation naturally brings about a change in the Alliance’s identity and geopolitical understanding.

During the Operation Deny Flight over Bosnia skies in the early 1990s, NATO offered first promising signs of adaptation to the post-Cold War environment while having engaged its first combat mission by downing four Bosnian Serb fighter-bombers in violation of the implemented no-fly zone.¹

Since then, the Alliance showed solidarity under the Article V of the Washington Treaty following the tragic 9/11 attacks on the US; and in 2003 NATO expanded its operations beyond the North-Atlantic area by assuming the command of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Finally by 2011, global strategic community witnessed the Alliance playing a key role in Libya during the civil war through enforcing a naval arms embargo, no-fly zone, and air-ground strikes against pro-Gaddafi elements.

Recalling NATO during the Cold War times, which was primarily concerning about bulky Soviet formations and the balance of terror by nuclear weapons in a bipolar world, it would be fair to say that the last two decades have
marked an outstanding transformation effort that keeps shaping the future of the Alliance.

The authors of this report aim to explain the major dynamics of NATO’s transformation. In doing so, the paper will firstly focus on underlying reasons of the transformation in an effort to provide a tour d’horizon for readers. Secondly, NATO defense economics and the very need for the Smart Defense approach will be examined. Thirdly, major components of the transformation’s military angle, namely the Connected Forces Initiative and the NATO Response Force will be analyzed. Subsequently, the report will present a thought-provocative discussion by questioning the continuation in the state-led threats posed to NATO in the light of Russian defense modernization and Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions. Within this context, a section will also discuss the role of tactical nuclear weapons in the North Atlantic Alliance’s future military strategic posture. Finally, the authors will provide their conclusion with regard to NATO’s transformation.

*The Raison d’être of the Transformation: Emerging Threats, Changing Security Environment and Austerity Measures*

With a mission of providing strategic analysis capability, NATO established the Emerging Security Challenges Division in 2010. Notably, the Alliance has defined the “emerging security challenges” as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), cyber defense, and energy security.²
In tandem, the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept has drawn attention to cyber security, energy security, terrorism, extremism and radicalization, instability beyond NATO borders, and environmental threats as the main pillars of the new security environment.³

Indeed, the 21st century threat landscape is far more different and complex when compared to the Cold War’s bipolar-driven security environment. In 1961, only four states of the international system, France- the UK- the US and Russia, were holding nuclear weapons in their arsenals. As of today, the world witnesses 9 nuclear-armed states (France, the UK, the US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea) which means only 1/3 of the nuclear weapons-capable powers remains to be NATO member.

Furthermore, one cannot reduce the risk of strategic weapons proliferation in the 21st century into solely nuclear weapons. Firstly, while it was only the Americans and the Russians that were capable of delivering “a Hiroshima-sized bomb” with missiles in 1961, at the time of writing, some 27 states enjoy such a capability, even though many of these states’ delivery capacities are limited with theater-range missiles, and fortunately, only some of those actors obtain WMD warheads.⁴ Secondly, being easier to produce, biological and chemical weapons have become more attractive to the Third World. Furthermore, as weaponized chemical and biological agents can be packaged in submunitions, these WMDs can be used as true terror weapons while missile accuracy problems could be tolerated. Finally, while state-actors were leading to main concerns about WMD and delivery means proliferation
in the past, at present non-state violent networks are striving to obtain WMD capability that could pose a destructive CBRN (chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear)-terrorism threat.

In conjunction with the Emerging Security Challenges Division’s scope as well as NATO’s most recent strategic concept document’s assessments, the Alliance is now attaching greater importance to the terrorism threat. Notably, the 9/11 terrorist attacks to the United States marked a crucial moment for the North Atlantic Alliance, as the article V was invoked for the first time in the alliance’s decades-long history.6 Within this context, NATO has initiated the Operation Active Endeavour under the article V. Furthermore, in order to counter a hybrid danger, NATO’s Combined Joint CBRN Defense Task Force is also focusing on CBRN-terrorism threat.7 Last but not least, based on the decisions taken at the Prague Summit (2002) and the Istanbul Summit (2004), the Alliance has been gradually improving its intelligence sharing capabilities which play a key role in counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism operations.8

On the other hand, the most important impact of placing terrorism at the NATO scope is probably the shift in the North Atlantic Alliance’s military and geopolitical paradigm. Clearly, in the post-9/11 period, the terrorism threat necessitated the Alliance to adopt a global war on terrorism perspective.9 In this regard, NATO defense ministers tasked the Alliance’s military authorities to prepare a Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism in December 2001, which was then approved by the North Atlantic Council and endorsed by Heads of State and Government at the Prague Summit (2002).10 Within this
In brief, in the 2000s NATO has faced a complex threat landscape and security environment that made a major transformation inevitable. As explained hitherto, this threat landscape includes different aspects such as terrorism, cyber defense, energy security, and WMD proliferation. What is worse, all the aforementioned issues take place in hybrid environments in which state and non-state actors pose a set of individual and interrelated threats. In the meanwhile, state-led threats continue to be relevant, especially given Russia’s military modernization and geopolitical ambitions which this report addresses.

In order to understand the nature of the new security environment and foster a quick adaptation, NATO has established the Allied Command Transformation in 2003. Without a doubt, in order to counter such full-spectrum of security challenges, NATO needs enormous resources to consolidate its
capabilities. As a matter of fact, the incumbent Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, General Jean-Paul Paloméros indicated that the biggest threat for the Alliance is the “massive reduction in defense budgets”. Yet, NATO faces decreasing defense budgets that necessitated the Smart Defense approach.13

**NATO Smart Defense Approach and Austerity Measures in the Allied Defense Economics**

Following the 2010 Strategic Concept, NATO Secretary-General at the time, Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced the Smart Defense approach that could be summarized as “ensuring greater security, for less money, by working together with more flexibility”.14 In an age of tight defense budgets for many NATO-member states, the North Atlantic Alliance declared the main pillars of the Smart Defense approach as prioritization-specialization-cooperation in order to establish a viable security umbrella for the allied nations, as “in these times of austerity, each euro, dollar, or pound sterling counts”.15 In fact, this paper argues that the Smart Defense approach reflects NATO’s strategic responses as well as the strategic imperatives and necessities under the current conjuncture.

Without a doubt, the first and foremost issue with regard to the Smart Defense initiative is the need for weathering austerity measures in the allied defense economics while developing capabilities to confront the emerging threats. Clearly, NATO’s European members’ defense spending fell about
The main advantage of the North Atlantic Alliance defense economics, which is equally tantamount to a burden on Washington, remains the very fact that the US’ some 600 billion dollars defense spending overtakes the Russian-Chinese total of some 180.4 billion dollars.\(^\text{18}\) 

Nevertheless, in terms of real defense expenditure and GDP-defense expenditure ratio, still the Trans-Atlantic average is in decline while Euro-Asia, the Middle East and Asia regions are significantly on rise.\(^\text{19}\) Although the current picture does not put NATO under an intolerable strategic imbalance, thanks to Washington without a doubt, the aforementioned trends suggest bigger problems in future. Furthermore, while the NATO members are cooperating on defense and security issues, at the same time they are competing in major arms contracts\(^\text{20}\), such as Turkey’s T-Loramids project...
in which Eurosam and Raytheon push for the lucrative 4 billion USD air and missile defense tender.

Interestingly, the %2 defense budget-GDP ratio comes into prominence as a key pillar of keeping the Alliance’s defense economics sharp. In a pessimistic fashion, the majority of NATO-member states remained below “the %2 threshold” prior to the 2014 Wales Summit. In fact, the European members were allocating about %2,5 of their GDPs to defense spending during the early 1990s 21, when the strategic legacy of the Cold War was still alive.

In fact, Washington has been repeatedly reminding the European allies to meet the “%2 NATO benchmark”22. Yet, considering overall Europe (including non-NATO states), the average defense expenditure ratio remained about %1,5 of GDP between the years 2007-201223. Given the overall picture, the only good news for the Alliance is the fact that still, the top defense spenders of Europe are NATO-members; namely, the UK, France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey respectively24. On the other hand, for most of the Western Europeans, the %2 benchmark means an economic delusion.

The pressure of declining defense economics brings about the necessity for more interoperability among the allied states. Within the context, The Connected Forces Initiative and the NATO Response Force are coming into prominence as key components of NATO’s transformation.
At the Chicago Summit in 2012, the Alliance has set its priorities and objectives for the NATO Forces 2020 plan, which attaches utmost importance on mobile, deployable and interoperable capabilities. Given the aforementioned defense economics constraints, the Connected Forces Initiative (hereafter the CFI) was designed to support the Smart Defense approach in compliance with the NATO Forces 2020 plan.

Following the most recent 2014 Wales Summit, the Allied leaders have endorsed 6 key elements for the CFI for shaping the NATO strategic force posture against emerging threats. These 6 key pillars are as follows:

- Updated NATO Education, Training Exercise and Evaluation (ETEE) Policy
- Broader NATO Training Concept 2015 – 2020
- A 2015 High-Visibility Exercise
- Major NATO Exercises from 2016 Onwards Program
- Continuing Progress in Implementing the Technological Aspects of the CFI
- A Special Operations Command Headquarters Capability under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)

Among the key pillars mentioned above, especially high-visibility exercises and the 2016-onwards major military exercises program deserve attention.
Especially in the light of Russian aggression in Ukraine, the North Atlantic Alliance opts for showing a more robust and determined posture. In doing so, the Wales Summit declaration stated that NATO will hold the Trident-Juncture 2015 high-visibility exercises next year with the participation of 25,000 troops hosted by Spain, Italy, and Portugal. Furthermore, the Major Exercises Program from 2016 Onwards is expected to foster the North Atlantic Alliance’s combat-readiness and consolidate its capabilities to react crises. In addition, the Readiness Action Plan approved in the Wales Summit openly stresses the aim of responding the challenges posed by Russia. In this regard, the plan aims to provide security assurances through continuous military presence and activity “in the eastern part of the Alliance” on rotational basis.

As NATO strives for showing a higher profile vis-à-vis its current and potential competitors, a robust, swiftly deployable military arm is strongly needed. Thus, the idea of the NATO Response Force (hereafter NRF) has been shaped from such a standpoint. Moreover, the NRF is expected to be at the heart of the CFI.

*The NATO Response Force: Harbingers of a NATO Revolution in Military Affairs*

The Alliance announced the NRF initiative at the Prague Summit in 2002, and the Allied Defense Ministers approved the project in Brussels in 2003. The raison d’être for the establishment of such a force was mainly addressing the requirements of the post-Cold War era through such an agile and capable military arm. Subsequently, the NRF reached its initial operational capabilities in
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Briefly, the NRF consists of some 25,000 high-readiness personnel from air, land, maritime and special forces as well as their support elements. The NRF is responsible with a wide-array of missions including counter-terrorism, non-combat evacuation, consequence management, and such an elite unit could “vanguard for a larger follow-on force”32. Moreover, at the recent Wales Summit (September 2014), the Allied leaders have decided to establish a Very High-Readiness Joint Task Force that is designed to be deployed within a few days against the emerging threats33.

According to Admiral Sir Ian Forbes, who served as the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation during the initiation of the NRF, the Response Force has not only been designed as an operational asset, but as a test-bed for “injecting transformational thinking into the Alliance”34. Furthermore, the British Admiral argued, the planned transformation has not been limited with technology, but it should incorporate the necessary shifts in mindset and strategic culture. The main necessity for such a broad transformational scope is the requirements of the new, complex warfare model in which high-tempo fighting is taking place simultaneously with peace-keeping and humanitarian aid operations within the very same 50km square35. Under such complicated battlefield circumstances, “information dominance and decision-making superiority” appear as key factors of success; therefore, intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) information must be available and usable.
for tactical-level commanders\textsuperscript{36}.

To sum up, the Connected Forces Initiative and the NATO Response Force will shape the Alliance’s future capabilities and military thinking. As indicated earlier, NATO has redefined its threat perceptions which brought about a geopolitical shift and transformation in the Alliance’s identity. Within this context, the allied nations should be able to conduct quick-response operations beyond the North Atlantic area. Furthermore, such an effort would be tantamount to full spectrum operations under sensitive politico-military conditions and tense social fault lines. Yet, it would be naïve to claim that the era of “traditional” state-led threats is over for NATO. In fact, such a statement could not even resonate with the Baltic or Polish strategic communities. Therefore, while focusing on the emerging security challenges, it would be equally wise to carefully monitor “re-emergence of a Cold War-remnant threat”, namely the Russian Federation.


Along with several threats, we believe that recent trends in the Russian military modernization, coupled with Moscow’s aggression in its post-Soviet hinterland has made NATO to pursue interoperability and rapid-deployment issues in a more determined fashion. As a matter of fact, US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel stated that NATO members would need higher defense spending as Russia’s moves have shown that Europe “still lives in a dangerous world”\textsuperscript{37}. 

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Although Ukraine is not a member of NATO, Russia’s fait accompli in Crimea and the return of “conquest wars” have provoked deep threat perceptions in some NATO-member states. In this regard, Baltic members of the North Atlantic Alliance, which are exposed to the Russian threat compared to the other allies, opt for a robust and even permanent NATO presence in their territories to form a tangible deterrence. Likewise, another NATO nation bordering the Russians, Poland, is on the same page with the Baltic States. So much so that former Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski openly voiced his country’s will to deploy persistent NATO combat brigades.

In fact, following the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Moscow has initiated several defense programs that added more oil in the fire. According to a monograph published by the US Army Strategic Studies Institute, “fundamental organizational changes that finally broke the Russian armed forces away from the Soviet model in 2008–09 are now irreversible.” Furthermore, in the light of recent developments, the former Minister of Defense Anatoliy Serdyukov’s (2007 – 2012) defense modernization plans are now gaining realistic grounds under the incumbent defense minister, Sergey Shoygu. In this regard, if everything goes as planned, Moscow’s new Defense Plan 2020 (GPV 2020 in Russian acronym) will equip the Russian Armed Forces with up to 70 percent modern arms by 2020.

Another concern for NATO emanating from the Russian Federation’s military march could be Moscow’s uptrend in defense economics while the North Atlantic Alliance faces austerity measures. For instance, Russia’s defense
budget-GDP ratio was around %2.7 in the 2000s, and notably, in the 2010s the ratio witnessed %3.5 level (even %4.5. considering total military expenditure in SIPRI’s “definition of military expenditure”\textsuperscript{42}.

The aforementioned defense economics calculations and military modernization plans could mean less than a meaningful picture for non-security studies readers. Yet, a 2013 article penned by Nikolas Gvosdev summarizes the pressing situation as follows:

“…the Russian military, by 2020, will return to a million active-duty personnel, backed up by 2300 new tanks, some 1200 new helicopters and planes, with a navy fielding fifty new surface ships and twenty-eight submarines, with one hundred new satellites designed to augment Russia’s communications, command and control capabilities. Putin has committed to spending some $755 billion over the next decade to fulfill these requirements\textsuperscript{43}.

Nevertheless, it is not solely the Russian defense modernization –in terms of military equipment– that poses the main threat to the North Atlantic Alliance, but Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions and menacing politico-military narrative under the rule of hawkish circles coming from top security echelons of the Russian statecraft. Such geopolitical aggression is even visible in scenarios of Russia’s military drills and war-games. For example, when Russia and Belarus conducted joint Zapad-2009 Ladoga-2009 military exercises very close to Poland with some 30,000 personnel, the exercises’ scenarios included “simulating suppression of a Polish minority uprising in Belarus, and the rehearsing
When the New START treaty entered into force in 2011, some 150-200 TNWs have been deployed in the European NATO allies; Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Belgium and Germany under the nuclear burden-sharing concept.

In fact, for sometime NATO’s military thought has been shifting from favoring TNW deployment in European allies’ territories. In this regard, unlike the 1991 and the 1999 strategic concepts; interestingly, the most recent strategic concept of NATO (2010) did not mention “sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe”44. Notably, the 1991 Strategic Concept evaluated the role of sub-strategic nuclear assets in Europe as a link to the alliance’s strategic nuclear capabilities, and also as a way of strengthening transatlantic defense ties. In consistence with the 1991 Strategic Concept, the 1999 Strategic Concept of
NATO reiterated the same perspective with regard to the tactical nuclear assets’ roles and functions in the allied defense posture\textsuperscript{47}.

Despite the very fact that the 2010 Strategic Concept firmly underlined that NATO will remain nuclear as long as these weapons are present, the new paradigm refrains from openly mentioning sub-strategic nuclear assets, and states that “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies”\textsuperscript{48}.

In the light of the aforementioned evolution of NATO strategic concept documents’ perspectives, one could argue that the alliance will definitely be giving up its tactical nuclear capabilities in the near future. However, this paper argues that Washington’s stance with regard to TNWs could be more conservative, thus it could lead to the preservation of the current tactical nuclear status. In this regard, the United States Nuclear Posture Review stresses that the U.S. will retain forward-deployed nuclear weapons on tactical fighter-bombers and heavy bombers through the life extension program for the B-61 bomb\textsuperscript{49}. Notably, the upgraded variant, B61-12, will be low-yield but high-precision thanks to a guided tail kit which would make it more “usable” in the battlefield. Moreover, the B61-12 tactical nuclear bomb will be able for delivery by the F-35. Notably, a combination of the new TNW’s attributes and the F-35 multi-role fighter’s stealthy capability could be a significant upgrade for NATO\textsuperscript{50}.

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A reason for the aforementioned strategic prediction is Moscow’s robust sub-strategic nuclear posture. In this regard, the Russian Federation is reported to enjoy about 2,000 operational TNWs with other yet non-operational warheads. Unlike NATO’s narrow tactical nuclear deployments in Europe, Moscow operates its sub-strategic arsenal through various delivery means such as nuclear-capable aircrafts (i.e. TU-22, SU-24), surface to air missiles (i.e., SA-10), submarine-launched assets (i.e. SS-N-9, SS-N-12), and ballistic missiles (i.e. SS-26 Iskander). Furthermore, the Russian defense planning sees TNWs as means of compensating for Moscow’s conventional military handicaps, a response to NATO’s ballistic missile defense projects, and a component in case of a military buildup against China.

**Missile Defense and NATO**

In parallel with NATO’s threat perceptions from the WMD proliferation, global military trends suggest a true need for improved strategic defensive capabilities against ballistic missiles and especially their WMD-tipped warheads. Firstly, ballistic missiles enjoy major advantages with regard to maintenance, training, and logistics when compared to fighter aircrafts and bombers. Secondly, ballistic missiles’ swift operational features consolidate the strategic surprise factor that stresses passive and active defenses, as well as pre-emptive measures. And thirdly, in combination with the aforementioned aspects, the
risk of ballistic missile-delivered biological, chemical and nuclear warheads makes these weapon systems to become a grave concern for global peace and security. From a defense economics perspective, the combination of large ballistic missile arsenals and alleged or proven WMD programs (i.e. Iran, North Korea, and Syria) add fuel to the fire. Because, allocating generous funds to robust ballistic missile development programs cannot be translated into a real strategic weapons deterrent unless such delivery means are supported by WMD warheads. Besides, states that are not able to run nuclear programs usually opt for chemical and biological warheads that are cheaper and easier to obtain. Furthermore, biological and chemical submunitions in ballistic missile warheads make circular error probability (CEP) problems tolerable due to their wide dispersion capabilities. Finally, some problematic states’ perceptions on chemical and biological weapons are of great importance. At this point, it would be noteworthy to remind that in 1988, speaker of the Iranian Parliament at that time, Hashemi Rafsanjani, labeled chemical and biological weapons as the “poor man’s atomic bomb”.

In the light of the issues discussed hitherto, NATO officially draws attention to both ballistic missile and WMD warhead proliferation together as the ground for the allied missile defense efforts. At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, the North Atlantic Alliance has decided to enhance its missile defense capabilities (known as Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense-ALTBMD), which was mainly focusing on force protection against short and medium range ballistic missiles up to 3,000km range. The new missile defense concept adopted a broader perspective to protect not only deployed forces (theater...
NATO’s territorial defense expansion will not provide direct protection to the U.S. territory, but it would be important for Washington as the European security is an American national security interest.

NATO missile defense structure is designed to be a complex network of sea and land-based radars, sensors, space-based assets and satellite capabilities, as well as interceptors at different layers that would cover exo-atmospheric and endo-atmospheric levels. The main protection for the European populations and territories will be provided through the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). Within this context, interceptors will be deployed in Romania (2015 timeframe) and Poland (2018 timeframe), while an advanced BMD radar has already been placed in Turkey, Kurecik. Moreover, Spain is also playing a key role by the planned deployment of 4 Aegis destroyers in Rota. For a proper territorial missile defense, fully networked remote sensing is critical for NATO that necessitates complete networking between the forward-based radar in Turkey and interceptors in Poland and Romania. At this point, burden-sharing looms large as a critical issue of the EPAA. Put simply, NATO’s territorial defense expansion will not provide direct protection to the U.S. territory, but it would be important for Washington as the European security is an American national security interest. However, as the US defense budget is facing serious hardships, contribution by the European allies is of great importance.
From a broader perspective, some experts claim that the Alliance could see its increasing BMD capabilities as an alternative to its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and within this context, as a new concept of reassuring American defense commitments. Yet, from a military theoretical and doctrinal standpoint, it would be doubtful if tactical nuclear weapons’ functions could be replaced by strategic defensive systems. As a matter of fact, the recent Deterrence and Defense Posture Review of NATO openly stresses that “Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO’s overall capabilities for deterrence and defence alongside conventional and missile defence forces.” Thus, BMD – TNW equation –if not a dilemma– remains to be seen as an important aspect of NATO’s transformation. Moreover, as indicated earlier, the 1991 Strategic Concept openly emphasized the role of sub-strategic nuclear assets in Europe as a link to the alliance’s strategic nuclear forces, and as a tool of augmenting the main panacea to address the decline in most of the member states’ defense spending is to boost the allied interoperability capacity and to promote robust expeditionary forces that would be deployable at short notice for full spectrum missions.
The challenges posed by Russia will continue to dominate the Alliance’s agenda.

transatlantic ties. The 1999 Strategic Concept of the alliance also adopted the same perspective. Therefore in case NATO’s transformation disfavors TNWs, as the 2010 Strategic Concept did not openly emphasize sub-strategic nuclear weapons, a new link to NATO’s nuclear forces and a new emblem of transatlantic ties could be needed.

Conclusion

In sum, NATO’s transformation has been moving in parallel with the emerging threats, problematic issues in defense economics, and the Alliance’s plans to compensate for austerity measures through a complex defense and security cooperation.

This study concludes that the main panacea to address the decline in most of the member states’ defense spending is to boost the allied interoperability capacity and to promote robust expeditionary forces that would be deployable at short notice for full spectrum missions. In doing so, it is argued that the NATO Response Force (along with the recently announced Very High Readiness Joint Task Force) and the Connected Forces Initiative provide a promising basis for the transformation’s success.

Another key finding of this study is the vital necessity of keeping the allied tactical nuclear assets in Europe (in conjunction with the B-61 Life Extension Program) and promoting the allied missile defense shield simultaneously. Clearly, we believe that in addition to a flexible and robust conventional force,
a well-balanced offensive and defensive strategic weapons deterrent would serve well to the Alliance’s collective defense given the complex threat landscape that NATO has been facing.

Without a doubt, NATO’s transformation brings about a geopolitical shift regarding the out of area operations and strategic interests of the allies. Especially, terrorism and energy security challenges necessitate a global perspective.

Last but not least, it is seen that the challenges posed by Russia will continue to dominate the Alliance’s agenda. In fact, the most crucial part vis-à-vis the Russians is clearly beyond defending the Baltic States and Poland. It is about defending the article V of the Washington Treaty, and indivisibility of the allied security.
Notes


7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.


11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.


14. NATO, Smart Defence Smart TADIC™, Brussels, 2011, p.6


18. Ibid.


24 Ibid.


29 Ibid.


31 Ibid.


35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.


44 Andrew, Somerville. Poland, NATO, and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe, RUSI – Occasional Paper, February 2012, p.3.


47 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Strategic Concept, 1991, article 56; Strategic Concept, 1999, article 64.


49 US DoD, Nuclear Posture Review 2010, p.xiii


53 United Kingdom General Rapporteur Lord Lyell, Chemical and Biological Weapons: Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb, North Atlantic Assembly General Secretariat, AN:253 / STC (96)8, 1996.

54 NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Missile Defense Fact Sheet, 21 June 2011.


56 Ibid.


58 Ibid. p.39.


61 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Strategic Concept, 1991, article 56; Strategic Concept, 1999, article 64.
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